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A diagnosis of dementia is frightening for patients, as well as their family. Faced with 
such a diagnosis, some patients may opt for suicide, assisted death, or euthanasia. In 
some jurisdictions, advance euthanasia directives allow for these wishes to be fulfilled 
after patients lose decision-making capacity. But such directives face a unique 
challenge in the context of dementia, particularly because of the changes the disease 
inflicts on patients. On strong views of the longevity of advance directives, such 
changes are insufficient to challenge the authority of advance directives. Weak views, 
by contrast, assert that the changes wrought by dementia are often sufficient to negate 
the authority of advance directives. Despite their differences, both strong and weak 
views accept precedent autonomy as justifying a prima facie obligation to follow 
advance directives. This reliance on precedent autonomy, I suggest, is at the root of the 
challenge that advance directives face in the case of late-stage dementia. 
 
In response to this challenge, I will propose that a cohesive understanding of advance 
directives without the concept of precedent autonomy is possible. On such an account, 
advance directives may be authoritative insofar as they are reflective of current or future 
iii 
 
contemporary autonomous wishes. This nullifies the obligation to follow advance 
directives for the patient’s own sake, when they lack contemporary autonomy and/or will 
not regain it. Despite this, incorporating the contemporary interests of the patient’s 
family into treatment decisions may justify adherence to an advance directive when it 
yields a permissible outcome for the current patient. Such an account is not only 
plausible in theory, but faces the challenge of dementia with more permissible results 
than either strong or weak views of advance directives. Specifically, this account allows 
for both robust consideration of the contemporary experiential interests of the patient in 
late-stage dementia, as well as adherence to an advance directive when permissible. 
Abandoning precedent autonomy, I argue, more plausibly explains the role that advance 
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§ 1.0 – INTRODUCTION  
Dementia in its most common form, Alzheimer’s Disease, affects between 5-10% of 
people over 65, and 50% of people over 85.1 In its early stages, dementia may not pose 
a burden so severe that one would contemplate euthanasia. For most, though cognitive 
abilities may decline noticeably, they will remain functionally independent, and 
competent.2 But in its later stages, dementia poses a more pernicious threat: the loss 
not only of competence, but the loss of what made the patient themselves. They may 
lose their ability to comprehend language, develop delusions, hallucinations, or 
paranoia, and become aggressive with caregivers and family.3 Dementia, if a patient 
lives to its late stages, will render a patient quite unlike they were before – unable to 
make competent decisions, or provide insight into their own care needs. This drastic 
change generates our problem: how do we view the wishes of someone who is so 
different from how they once were? Further, how do we evaluate what is good for this 
changed patient considering the irreversibility of euthanasia or assisted death? 
 
Faced with a diagnosis of dementia, a patient may explore the idea of ending their life 
before the disease takes its toll. The question of assisted death for dementia patients is 
not hypothetical. Some form of assisted dying is legal in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, and ten American states. The exact nature 
 
1 Zoe Arvanitakis, Raj C. Shah, and David A. Bennett, “Diagnosis and Management of Dementia: 
Review,” JAMA 322, no. 16 (October 22, 2019): 1589, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2019.4782. 
2 Marilyn S Albert et al., “The Diagnosis of Mild Cognitive Impairement Due to Alzheimer’s Disease: 
Reccomendations from the National Institute on Aging-Alzheimer’s Association Workgroups on 
Diagnostic Guidelines for Alzheimer’s Disease,” Alzheimer’s & Dementia 7 (2011): 270–79, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jalz.2011.03.008. 
3 Arvanitakis, Shah, and Bennett, “Diagnosis and Management of Dementia.” 
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of such systems varies. Most offer only assisted suicide, where the patient may self-
administer a lethal drug, or consume it with the aid of a physician (or other licensed 
healthcare professional). In some jurisdictions, though patient assistance in the 
procedure is unnecessary, consent is required up until the point of administration. As a 
result, almost all jurisdictions which do allow for assisted death require the patient be 
competent at the time of their death. This is a limiting factor for some terminally ill 
patients, who fear they will be incapacitated before they are able to consent to their 
assisted death. Of these countries only the Netherlands currently allows for an advance 
euthanasia directive (AED)4, which allows a patient to stipulate when and how they 
would like to receive euthanasia after they are deemed decisionaly incompetent. In 
2017, the most recent year for which we have complete data, 169 people with dementia 
were euthanized in accordance with their AED in the Netherlands.5 In three of these 
cases, dementia had advanced to the point that the patients could no longer 
communicate, raising objections that the patients could no longer consent to their death, 
and may not share their past wishes.6  
 
In Canada, the government has moved to approve a bill7 to allow for a waiver of final 
consent, which would allow a patient to specify that euthanasia be carried out on a 
specific future date, regardless of the patient’s capacity. This waiver of final consent is 
 
4 Wet toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding [Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act], 1 April 2001, Stb. 2001,137. 
5 Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, “Annual Report 2017” (The Hague, Netherlands: Government 
of the Netherlands, April 2018), https://english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-
committees/documents/publications/annual-reports/2002/annual-reports/annual-reports. 
6 Regional Euthanasia Review Committees. 
7 Bill C-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying),1st Reading Feb 24, 2020, 1st 
sess., 43rd parl., 2020. https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-1/bill/C-7/first-reading 
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an advance euthanasia directive by another name. Such a waiver is of particular 
interest to those with neurodegenerative diseases, who fear waiting too long and thus 
losing capacity, or who fear having an assisted death earlier, forgoing some amount of 
life that they would believe is acceptable. Despite the challenges posed by the current 
legislation, patients with neurodegenerative diseases make up over 10% of total 
assisted deaths in Canada annually.8 Those who care for people suffering with 
dementia in Canada have demonstrated willingness to implement. In Quebec – the 
second largest province, with nearly a quarter of the Canadian population –  euthanasia 
by AED for those with late-stage dementia is supported by 45% of physicians,9 83% of 
nurses,10 and 83% of informal caregivers.11 This support increased to 71% of 
physicians12 and 91% of caregivers13 when the patient was classified as being in the 
terminal stages of their illness. Combining this wide openness to euthanasia directives 
for dementia patients, with the legal leeway to perform euthanasia for such patients, it 
seems likely that Canada will soon face the same ethical questions which currently face 
the Dutch. Of further note in the Canadian context Is the sheer speed of change to 
assisted death policy. Bill C-7, allowing for advance euthanasia directives, was tabled a 
 
8 Health Canada, Fourth Interim Report on Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada., 2019, 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/sc-hc/H14-230-4-2019-eng.pdf. 
9 Gina Bravo et al., “Quebec Physicians’ Perspectives on Medical Aid in Dying for Incompetent Patients 
with Dementia,” Canadian Journal of Public Health 109, no. 5–6 (December 2018): 729–39, 
https://doi.org/10.17269/s41997-018-0115-9. 
10 Gina Bravo et al., “Nurses’ Perspectives on Whether Medical Aid in Dying Should Be Accessible to 
Incompetent Patients with Dementia: Findings from a Survey Conducted in Quebec, Canada,” Geriatric 
Nursing 39, no. 4 (July 2018): 393–99, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gerinurse.2017.12.002. 
11 Gina Bravo et al., “Are Informal Caregivers of Persons With Dementia Open to Extending Medical Aid 
in Dying to Incompetent Patients? Findings From a Survey Conducted in Quebec, Canada:,” Alzheimer 
Disease & Associated Disorders 32, no. 3 (2018): 247–54, 
https://doi.org/10.1097/WAD.0000000000000238. 
12 Bravo et al., “Quebec Physicians’ Perspectives on Medical Aid in Dying for Incompetent Patients with 
Dementia.” 
13 Bravo et al., “Are Informal Caregivers of Persons With Dementia Open to Extending Medical Aid in 
Dying to Incompetent Patients?” 
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mere five years after the 2015 legalization of assisted death in Carter v. Canada.14 The 
pace of this change makes questions of euthanasia and advance directives even more 
relevant, even for jurisdictions who believe they are years away from legalization. 
 
Those facing dementia, then, may think seriously about taking control of their own 
deaths. In Canada and the Netherlands, this is no hypothetical – they can, and do 
pursue euthanasia or assisted suicide to avoid a fate they find intolerable. In some 
jurisdictions, euthanasia may be requested via advance directives by dementia patients. 
In other jurisdictions, this may not be possible for some time, if at all. The minutia of 
public opinion on euthanasia, certainly a research project in its own right, is not my 
focus here. Suffice it to say that jurisdictions have shown a track record of gradual 
liberalization of assisted death laws, as has Canada, from assisted suicide to AED. It is 
possible that other jurisdictions will have similar evolutions. If nothing else, the very 
existence of such liberalized euthanasia regimes serves as a prompt for argument 
about their morality. This paper is focused, considering the situation at hand, on a 
narrow, essential question: How should we view, in moral terms, the authority of an 
AED when the patient will face late-stage dementia?  
 
I will argue that dementia poses such a threat to our understanding of advance 
directives, and autonomy, that we have ought to consider an account of advance 
directives which rejects precedent autonomy. Advance directives, on this view, serve to 
 
14 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 
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mark the boundaries of what a patient considers acceptable treatment considering their 
preferences and values. The moral weight of advance directives comes from their utility 
in avoiding a future in which a patient is forced to live in a state where their critical 
interests are actively thwarted, and their autonomy limited. Dementia makes such a 
future impossible for a large swathe of patients, thereby weakening the strength of 
advance directives. 
 
Recognizing that dementia reduces our obligation to follow advance directives for the 
patient’s sake does not restrict our ability to do so for other reasons. Nor does it entail 
that we simply defer to a contemporary best interests standard. In fact, embracing my 
revised view allows us to integrate, and better conceive of, the interests of the loved 
ones of a patient. Such interests carry weight, and may be decisive in care decisions 
where there are multiple courses of action which all have permissible clinical outcomes. 
In such cases, families have a clear prerogative to influence care in one way or another. 
Further, if their wishes coincide with the patient’s now nullified advance directive, this 
opportunity can provide some degree of solace to families and loved ones, in seeing the 
patient treated in a manner which would have suited their former self. Such an outcome 
can be provided, even on an account where directives are radically weakened.  
 
§ 2.0 – THE ARGUMENT THUS FAR  
The discourse on advance directives and dementia has a wide spectrum of participants: 
the ‘strong’ defense of advance directives headed by Dworkin, the ‘psychological 
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continuity’ rebuttal of the ‘strong’ defense championed largely by Rebecca Dresser, and 
other prominent theorists, such as Jeff McMahan, falling more or less in the middle. 
Though Dworkin’s view is most aptly described as the orthodox view, all accounts 
explored in §2 accept the premise that advance directives have lasting weight for 
patients who are permanently incapacitated. They disagree on the ease with which such 
directives may be overridden, by contemporary experiential interests, or rendered moot 
by a lack of interests in continued life. I will argue that this premise warrants 
reconsideration – that we should explore an alternative account which disregards 
precedent autonomy altogether. 
 
§ 2.1 – Strong views 
Dworkin argues for a strong view of the longevity of advance directives on which 
violating advance directives is a serious violation of respect for one’s autonomy. 
Advance directives are representative of ‘critical interests’: the broader picture of what 
one wants their life to mean, and the coherent system of values by which one lives.15 
Dworkin contrasts critical interests with experiential interests: the things we like to do, 
the pain we feel is tolerable, etc.16  The former interests have priority over the latter, 
since frustrating critical interests affects the meaning of one’s entire life, whereas 
frustrating experiential interests frustrates only one’s contemporary desires for 
something comparatively mundane. Formalizing critical interests, in the form of an 
advance directive, protects one from having them violated should one lose capacity to 
 
15 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (New York: Vintage, 1992), 200. 
16 Dworkin, 200. 
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voice them oneself. In cases of late-stage dementia, Dworkin is clear that critical 
interests should have priority over potentially conflicting experiential interests. An 
advance directive may only be crafted by a patient with capacity – the requisite 
autonomy to reflect on their critical interests and the cohesive shape of their life.17 
These considered wishes may only be overruled by a patient who later engages in a 
considered judgement, revising their critical interests. Since dementia patients (insofar 
as they lack capacity) are unable to do this, we must abide by their advance directives. 
Failing to do so, on Dworkin’s view, would disrespect the broader value of their life, 
even if we intended to respect their contemporary interests.18 
 
McMahan endorses an embodied mind account of personal identity, on which even if a 
later dementia patient lacks the sort of meaningful psychological connection to their 
prior self, they are still the same individual, validly subject to their advance directives.19 
Contrary to Dresser and Parfit, a lack of psychological continuity caused by late stage 
dementia does not make the demented patient a different person. It instead makes the 
demented patient a non-person, or potentially a changed person, though still the same 
individual by virtue of their having maintained the same embodied mind.20 Such change 
would warrant a discounting of the power of advance directives, but not complete 
disregard for them. McMahan maintains that advance directives may still be 
authoritative particularly in end-of-life decisions for demented patients. Considering the 
 
17 Dworkin, 206. 
18 Ibid, 231. 
19 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 494. 
20 McMahan, 495. 
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interests expressed by the advance directive, and the comparatively weak interests in a 
demented patient in continued life (considering their lack of forethought, quality of life, 
etc.) these prior interests can outweigh their interests in continued life, even if they no 
longer share or comprehend of their past directive.21 
 
Accounts on Dworkin’s side of the spectrum face problems insofar as they undervalue 
contemporary interests and overvalue precedent autonomy, producing outcomes of 
which we should be suspect. The root of this suspicion, I assert, is reliance on 
precedent autonomy. Dworkin considers a scenario in which a dementia patient crafts 
an AED which stipulates she be killed22 in the late stages of her dementia.23 Let us call 
this Case A. On both the grounds of her precedent autonomy, and that of beneficence 
(particularly towards her critical interests) we should abide by such a directive, even in 
the face of conflicting interests (i.e., vocalized desire to live).24 In respecting the patient 
as a whole person, rather than just as her later demented self, we are obligated on this 
view to abide by her critical interests and execute the advanced euthanasia directive. 
McMahan would presumably come to a similar conclusion, though on the grounds that 
 
21 McMahan, 502. 
22 In this section of his considerations, Dworkin treats the case as requesting comfort care only, though he 
mentions that “They may consider trying to make the other arrangements I mentioned: to have their 
money given away, or even, if possible, to be killed (…) Is there a conflict between respecting Margo’s 
precedent autonomy, if she had signed such a living will, and doing what would later be in her best 
interests?” (230) Though he treats the case as if she requested that life sustaining care be forgone, I will 
address his more severe hypothetical, that she requests euthanasia. I do this in part because he 
mentions it in the same breath as other life-ending or life-shortening requests, and also because if his 
account should stand scrutiny, it should apply successfully to euthanasia as well.  
23 Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, 227. 
24 Ibid, 231. 
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her time-relative interest in continuing to live are outweighed by her broader interests in 
dying in a manner which comports with her life’s values.  
 
Both of the above conclusions are plausible, and we should accept them. But consider 
what the treatment of a patient in a reverse of the above case would entail: 
Case B: A patient, B, crafts an advance directive that demands maximal therapy 
even into the deepest throws of late-stage dementia. Years later, her outlook 
changes dramatically: profoundly demented, she forgets her name, her family, 
her whereabouts, and lacks a basic understanding of her situation. B requests, 
frequently, and verbally, that nurses “let her die” and resists all efforts at hand 
feeding.  
 
We should not condone aggressive measures at this point. A feeding tube, for such a 
patient, could entail limb restraints to prevent resistance: causing a great deal of 
distress for someone with no understanding of their purpose.25 Further, should B 
contract an illness like COVID19,26 the potential life-sustaining measures include 
catheterization, ventilation, and chest compressions: measures which would incur 
lasting damage and pain even if successful. The measures requested are too drastic, 
the benefits too few. Dworkin’s account cannot withstand the challenge of case B, since 
the strength he gives advance directives would entail that, as expressions of their 
 
25 Further, using a feeding tube at this point in dementia would be against clinical guidelines. See: 
American Geriatrics Society Ethics Committee and Clinical Practice and Models of Care Committee, 
“American Geriatrics Society Feeding Tubes in Advanced Dementia Position Statement,” Journal of the 
American Geriatrics Society 62, no. 8 (August 2014): 1590–93, https://doi.org/10.1111/jgs.12924. 
26 For a recent account of the difficulties of a lack of advance directives for end-of-life decisions in the 
wake of COVID-19, see: Joel Rowe, “The Pandemic Should Change the Way We Talk About Dying,” The 




autonomy and reflective of their critical interests, we implement these drastic and cruel 
treatments.  
 
In case A, of which McMahan uses a facsimile in his work,27 the weak interest in 
continued life makes it easily overruled by an advance directive favoring death. One 
could draw a distinction based on the interest in avoiding pain in this case: though B has 
a negligible interest in continued life (supporting the advance directive), she has a 
stronger interest in avoiding the pain of gastrostomy or resuscitation, which outweighs 
the advance directive. But this claim would be inconsistent with the rest of McMahan’s 
view. In A, McMahan asserts that the time-relative interest in life is sufficiently weak to 
be overruled by the patient’s interest in dying.28 McMahan must accept that the time-
relative interest in avoiding pain is similarly weak in B, allowing the advance directive to 
be abided by. If this is true, his account allows for a directive to require irresponsible 
medical treatment. We should find that this ignorance of later, comparatively ‘weak’ 
interests in B condemns McMahan’s view, even if it does not strike us as wrong in A.  
 
Both Dworkin and McMahan may make concessions to their initial theories. Dworkin 
may assert that our discomfort in case B is reflective of other reasons which validly 
override our reason to abide by B’s advance directive, not reflective of a weakness of 
the advance directive itself or of precedent autonomy. McMahan may assert that a 
distinction is drawn between avoiding pain and continuing to live which makes a weak 
 
27 McMahan, Ethics of Killing, 497. 
28 Ibid, 451. 
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time-relative interest in the former stronger than one in the latter. What these 
concessions show, however, is that the patient’s contemporary best interest, not their 
advance directive, is what legitimizes the goal in these cases. In A, it is plausible that 
the hastened death of the patient is permissible, but not obligatory: therefore, an 
advance directive which hastens death seems similarly permissible. In B, by contrast, it 
is plausible that subjecting the patient to such pain would be impermissible: therefore, 
an advance directive which would inflict such pain is unjustified. Judgement in these 
cases is responsive not to the moral weight of an advance directive, but rather to our 
judgements about what would be a good outcome for the patient in their current state.  
 
§ 2.2 – Weak views  
On the psychological continuity view, prompted broadly by Parfit29 and championed 
specifically by Dresser, the strong view is flawed because the later dementia patient is 
no longer meaningfully the same person who crafted the advance directive. This 
account does not necessarily hold that the later demented patient, in having interests 
contrary to their past directive, is a numerically different individual than the patient at 
onset. It instead holds that the later demented patient may have changing preferences 
which should be respected in order to prevent making a patient subject to preferences 
they no longer share.30 In saying the patient is no longer relevantly themselves, those 
working in this vein may hold either that the patient is actually a distinct individual, a 
 
29 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), for Parfit's general view of 
the psychological account of personal identity, and see p 327 specifically for his view of later negation of 
precedent autonomy, in the 19th Century Russian. 
30 Rebecca Dresser, “Treatment Decisions and Changing Selves,” Journal of Medical Ethics 41, no. 12 
(December 2015): 975–76, https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2014-102237.   
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non-individual, or that they are the same individual but with radically shifting 
preferences, values31 or experiences. 32 Rather than attempt to comport with past 
directives, Dresser and others have maintained that clinicians should abide more (or 
exclusively) by the patient’s current interests. Further, they question the wisdom of 
advance directives altogether, questioning the degree to which anyone may make 
judgements about their later subjective state in late-stage dementia.33  This approach 
has obvious difficulties, not least of which involve the ability of clinicians to obtain 
reliable information about the subjective experience of those in late stage dementia, and 
determining what constitutes a ‘life worth living’ for someone without consulting their 
advance directive as authoritative.34  
 
Views on Dresser’s side of the spectrum seem to take my earlier critique to heart. What 
they are concerned with fundamentally are contemporary, interests of the patient when 
these interests conflict with past ones. But they too face challenges, since they accept a 
crucial first premise of the strong view of advance directives. This is the premise that 
advance directives gain their moral strength from the precedent autonomy of the 
patient. What makes them weak accounts of advance directive longevity is the fact that 
 
31 For an account on which advance directives may ignore the ability of a late-stage dementia patient to 
value, see Agnieszka Jaworska, “Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the 
Capacity to Value,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 28, no. 2 (April 1999): 105–38, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.1999.00105.x. 
32 For a recent account on which advance directives are undermined by transformative experience, see 
Emily Walsh, “Cognitive Transformation, Dementia, and the Moral Weight of Advance Directives,” 
American Journal of Bioethics Forthcoming (2020). 
33 Rebecca Dresser, “Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy,” The Hastings Center 
Report 25, no. 6 (November 1995): 32, https://doi.org/10.2307/3527839. 
34 Rebecca Dresser and John A. Robertson, “Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for 
Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach,” Law, Medicine and Health Care 17, no. 3 
(September 1989): 234–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.1989.tb01101.x. 
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they believe such interests are null and void pending psychological disunity, cognitive 
change, or due to a lack of predictive ability. But at times, they make a strong claim in 
the opposite direction. Dresser has articulated this on multiple occasions, arguing that 
those diagnosed with early dementia need more information on what the experience of 
dementia would be like before taking decisive action or making a directive,35 and 
comparing dementia to other clinical situations where our predictions about how happy 
we are with a disease or an injury are inaccurate compared to patient outcomes.36 On 
this account, it would seem misguided to craft directives while ignoring the possibility of 
erroneous predictions, or the possibility of a lack of knowledge about the experience of 
dementia.  
 
Jaworska goes further than suggesting that mere preferences can change over the 
course of dementia. She asserts that the ability to value is maintained through 
dementia, though the disease may preclude any patient from acting on such values.37 
This entails not only that we should treat dementia patients as subjects who value, but 
also as subjects who can have a change in what they value, as their disease 
progresses. Walsh argues that because dementia is essentially a “transformative 
experience,” the rational thing to do upon receiving a dementia diagnosis is to let 
yourself experience these preference changes as the disease goes on.38 This 
 
35 Rebecca Dresser, “A Fate Worse Than Death?: How Biomarkers for Alzheimer’s Disease Could Affect 
End-of-Life Choices,” Indiana Health Law Review 12, no. 2 (October 27, 2015): 651, 
https://doi.org/10.18060/3911.0004. 
36 Dresser, “Treatment Decisions and Changing Selves.”  
37 Jaworska, “Respecting the Margins of Agency,” 131. 
38 Walsh, “Cognitive Transformation, Dementia, and the Moral Weight of Advance Directives,” 21. 
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conclusion shows her broader claim that an advance directive, for dementia patients, 
thwarts what may be valid changes in preferences from being attended to by caregivers.  
 
On any of the weak accounts, an objective best interests standard would dictate the 
clinical course of action once a dementia patient was sufficiently different from their past 
self to undermine their advance directive. But such a best interests standard is less than 
conclusive, and may provide vague direction. There are often several courses of action 
exist which may be permissible, or reasonably be conceived as keeping the patient’s 
best interests in mind. Faced with a dementia patient with minimal understanding of 
their situation, little interest in life, but little pain or distress, several outcomes are 
permissible. Their quick and painless natural death, their continued life, succumbing to 
a respiratory infection, palliative sedation, are all permissible outcomes. Reverting 
simply to a best interests standard leaves us directionless in these cases. It would be 
inconsistent, on the weak views, to default to the past advance directive. Since (echoing 
the strong view) advance directives represent narrative interests, and this later person is 
no longer relevantly the same person as the person who crafted such an advance 
directive, it is illegitimate to apply such a directive even in the absence of a conflicting 
contemporary interest.  
 
§ 3.0 – RECONSIDERING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES  
My discussion thus far has been insufficient to prove conclusively that the orthodox 
conceptions are illegitimate, or unsalvageable. But I believe I have shown that dementia 
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poses a challenge to our current understanding of advance directives and autonomy. 
Adherence to a strong account of longevity runs the risk of legitimizing pointless or even 
harmful treatment which the patient can no longer value in the way they once did. The 
weak account, however, lacks clear guidance, and insofar as it is patient-centered it 
ignores what seem to be valid interests of loved ones, even when accommodating them 
may yield permissible outcomes. This challenge warrants attention, either in 
considerations of how existing accounts may accommodate such concerns, or in a 
broader reconsideration of our theories. I will take the latter approach. 
 
Revisiting the foundations on which Dworkin builds his understanding of precedent 
autonomy and advance directives, I will outline a minimalist account of advance 
directives which departs from both the strong and weak view of the longevity of advance 
directives. We can maintain, I argue, a plausible account of the power of advance 
directives which comports with permissible clinical outcomes, without relying on 
precedent autonomy. Moreover, ignoring precedent autonomy as generating obligations 
to follow advance directives allows us to accommodate cases of late-stage dementia 
without engaging with the more difficult question of identity.  
 
In refreshing our assessment of the nature of advance directives, consider Dworkin’s 
Jehovah’s Witness case, which he uses to justify his broader intuitions about advance 
directives and precedent autonomy: 
JW: A Jehovah’s Witness patient signs a directive which states that should he 
require a blood transfusion to save his life, he be denied one (because of his 
16 
 
religious beliefs) even if he later countermands his directive and pleads for a 
transfusion. He later requires a transfusion, and begs for it to be administered.39  
 
Dworkin’s assessment of this case is that we would not be violating his autonomy by 
administering the transfusion if the patient were competent when he made his later 
demand. But if we were confident that the patient was incompetent when he made his 
later demand (the effects of medication, pain, or temporary brain injury), we have, on 
Dworkin’s view, an obligation not to administer the transfusion. Administering the 
transfusion in this case would mean the patient “would become competent again and 
become appalled at having had a treatment he believed worse for him than dying.”40 
That we would not administer the transfusion in this latter case is evidence that we 
believe precedent autonomy is genuine. We should abide by it, on his view, not 
because we really think that the patient still shares these wishes. Rather, the directive is 
authoritative since countermanding a past autonomous decision is impermissible, 
unless the patient autonomously negates it.41  
 
Dworkin rejects the view that it is the prediction that the patient will regain 
consciousness which does the moral heavy lifting. Such a view would see precedent 
autonomy as unnecessary for the execution of the above directive. He argues that this 
prediction would be similarly true if the Witness’s plea for a transfusion was fully 
autonomous – we could very well guess that he would later regret this, as his actions 
conflict with the values he holds, and those of his community. Yet we would have to, in 
 





this case, abide by his later wishes not because we thought he would never come to 
regret it, but because it was an autonomous demand.42 Therefore the value we place on 
advance directives are demanded by autonomy, rather than beneficence. While I agree 
with Dworkin that in the latter case we would be obligated to provide the transfusion, I 
disagree that this conclusion provides, as he asserts, a sweeping justification for 
precedent autonomy and advance directives.  
 
Just because we accept the supremacy of contemporary autonomy when the patient 
makes an autonomous later request does not automatically entail that we ignore their 
incompetent request to protect precedent autonomy. Dworkin is correct that 
contemporary autonomy motivates us to provide the patient with the transfusion should 
they make a competent request which conflicts with their earlier preference. In this 
case, respect for autonomy gives us ample reason to comply. But when the patient 
makes an incompetent request, we may continue adhering to their advance directive 
insofar as it is an indication of the critical interests they would come to experience 
should they regain competence. We might act, when the patient’s latter request is 
incompetent, out of concern to avoid a state of affairs which they would find detestable, 
and in the absence of indication that this is no longer the case. The extent to which the 
patient would find their future detestable is largely determined by their contemporary 
autonomy, and the critical interests they hold. Precedent autonomy is not necessary for 
such an understanding. 
 
42 Dworkin, 228. 
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When a patient has contemporary autonomy, their request usurps their past directive 
even if we believe they will come to regret this. When they are making their later 
demand incompetently, however, we may continue to avoid the blood transfusion on 
grounds other than precedent autonomy. We are faced with two outcomes: we allow the 
patient to die, or we subject the patient to a life during which their contemporary 
autonomy, and critical interests, are actively limited and suppressed.43 Considering 
those two outcomes, the former option is preferable, because it allows the patient to 
avoid something they view as worse than death. Advance directives have force, then, 
insofar as they aid us in avoiding outcomes which would subject the patient to a state in 
which their autonomy is overridden against their will. The suggestion that precedent 
autonomy is unnecessary in legitimizing our adherence to advance directives does not 
mean we should similarly weaken our respect for contemporary autonomy. Rather it is 
contemporary autonomy which is of concern in both cases of competent and 
incompetent requests. When competent, we respect contemporary autonomy by 
following their request – even if we believe it is misguided. When incompetent, we can 
respect the patient’s future contemporary autonomy by ignoring their request. Precedent 
autonomy needs not have anything to do with our deliberations in such a case – that is 
not what makes advance directives reason-giving. Instead, we may view an advance 
directive as reason-giving insofar as it serves as evidence of current or future 
contemporary autonomous wishes and/or critical interests.  
 
 
43 This holds only if we have a reasonable degree of certainty that the patient would be in a state to share 
their prior religious convictions. If there was reason to believe that they may awake in a cognitively altered 
state, we should radically devalue their directive, as I will later argue.  
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I argued in §2 that the case of dementia poses a challenge to advance directives – a 
challenge which warrants broad reconsideration of precedent autonomy as generating 
obligations to follow advance directives. Though contemporary autonomy provides 
reason to reject a past directive even when we believe it has bad outcomes, such an 
assumption does not entail that when a patient is incapacitated we are acting in the 
interest of protecting the patient’s precedent autonomy. What Dworkin views as 
essential to advance directives, I suggest, is unnecessary.  
 
We can maintain an appreciation of contemporary autonomy without immediately 
assuming such autonomy is lasting. When a patient has contemporary autonomy, their 
competent decisions have supremacy, and we should act on them. But once a patient is 
unable to conceive of the very critical interests their autonomous directive was meant to 
protect, we lack an obligation to abide by such directives. When a patient lacks 
contemporary autonomy, we should act to avoid subjecting them to some future state of 
affairs in which their contemporary autonomy and critical interests are knowingly 
thwarted. In this light, an advance directive should be adhered to insofar as it provides 
an indication of what they will find a tolerable state when they regain competence. 
Moreover, it protects their contemporary autonomy and critical interests in the future, 
once they recover.  
 
There are patients for whom later appreciation of their critical interests is impossible. 
Such patients may be suffering from late-stage dementia – the primary focus of this 
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paper – be in a permanent vegetative state, brain dead, or have sustained a severe 
brain injury producing permanent cognitive impairment, etc.44 These patients lack both 
contemporary autonomy (allowing them to affirm or negate their directive in or against 
their critical interests) and the prospect of regaining the ability to conceive of their critical 
interests in the future. For these patients, the force of their past advance directive is 
completely negated by the certainty that they will not come to realize their critical 
interests have been thwarted – their past autonomy disregarded.  
 
Though we have no reason to adhere to advance directives for such patients’ own sake, 
we may have reason to adhere to advance directives on other grounds. Advance 
directives fail to generate obligations to act in a certain way on the patient’s behalf once 
they cease the ability to experience their critical interests. But violations of these former 
interests will affect those who care about them: spouses,45 family, and caretakers,46 for 
instance. These critical interests play a foundational role in the way that family members 
and friends may deal with the loss of a loved one, especially when that loved one, 
though still breathing, barely resembles the person they used to know. Such is the case 
in late stage dementia. The family of a demented patient may be more apt to treat them 
 
44 It is worth noting here that this account of advance directives is subject to constraints around predictive 
power. Questions of conclusiveness around how severely cognitive function has been changed, how little 
a chance a patient has at regaining past cognitive function, coming out of a coma, etc., are challenging to 
answer on any view, including my own. Additionally problematic is the level of risk we may accept in such 
cases – the threshold of risk that a patient may re-conceive of their critical interests – before we negate 
an advance directive. Though such discussions are difficult, they are not unique to my view, and should 
not exclude it from consideration.  
45 Suzannah Clark, Tim Prescott, and Gemma Murphy, “The Lived Experiences of Dementia in Married 
Couple Relationships,” Dementia 18, no. 5 (July 2019): 1727–39, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1471301217722034. 
46 Kristie Kannaley et al., “Thematic Analysis of Blog Narratives Written by People with Alzheimer’s 




as if they were their former self, especially when treating them as their former self yields 
positive outcomes. Doing so may not bring comfort per se, as dementia will take an 
irreversible toll on the patient. But it may be preferable for the loved ones of the patient 
to maintain the patient’s critical interests, than accept that the person they once knew 
now occupies a permanently truncated body and mind.  
 
An argument to take the interests of loved ones into consideration is nothing new. But 
on my view, they gain increasing importance when we lack an obligation to follow a 
patient’s former advance directive for the patient’s own sake – that is, when we 
abandon precedent autonomy. Once a patient’s advance directive has been rendered 
meaningless by their dementia, we may default to whatever would yield a permissible 
clinical outcome. We may default, for example, to a contemporary patient interests 
standard.47 But in some cases, particularly for terminal illnesses and decisions at the 
end of life, many courses of action may be permissible. Unlike Dresser’s view, on my 
view an advance directive is not useless once its meaning to the patient is rendered 
moot. Indeed we can, and should, weigh the benefits of following an advance directive 
for the family’s sake against the burden it may cause the patient to experience.  
 
Incorporating the desires of loved ones into the treatment of a now-incapacitated patient 
may preserve some of their past critical interests, and provide some solace to those 
who care for them. But such integration has limits, particularly when it comes down to 
 
47 Dresser and Robertson, “Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions,” 240.  
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the burdens one’s family could impose on a later demented patient in the interest of 
preserving their critical interests. Dworkin’s account, as I argued in § 2.1, does a poor 
job of considering the contemporary interests of a dementia patient, precisely because it 
weighs precedent autonomy so highly compared to contemporary interests. On my 
account, there are no matters of autonomy at play once the patient has become 
permanently incapacitated. There are only the contemporary interests of which the 
dementia patient is capable, and the interests of their loved ones in seeing the patient 
be treated in a certain manner. The latter of these interests may serve to maintain the 
past advance directive, to paint a façade of continued autonomy.  
 
It is worth noting the remoter effects that such a shift in our understanding of advance 
directives may have. Most pointedly, such a view would impact patients who are now, or 
will soon, deliberate making such a directive. Such patents, presumably, care that their 
advance directive will be followed, and that it should not be thrown out for no reason 
whatsoever. They may care about this even though they realize that their future self 
may not share these views, as a result of their illness. For these patients, at the time of 
crafting their directive, it would be comforting to know that their advance directive will 
not be thrown out for no reason. Though, on my view, the authority of advance 
directives would be more sensitive to the contemporary interests of the patient than the 
strong view, directives are more likely to be followed than on the weak view. This 
outcome is consistent with a current patient crafting an advance directive, who may take 
solace in the following of their advance directive, while also caring about the experience 
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of the later, demented patient, thus having an interest in such a directive being sensitive 
to contemporary interests.  
 
There is one aspect of my account which to those who follow this debate is 
conspicuously absent: the challenge personal identity poses to the authority of advance 
directives. On the orthodox view, personal identity is important insofar as it determines 
who may be subject to advance directives. If our advance directives are, as such views 
argue, articulations of precedent autonomy, detached from our capacity to appreciate 
our autonomous wishes, then anyone who shares that identity is bound by their 
advance directive. Those who argue for the existence of pre- and post-persons, divided 
from the ‘person’ by a lack of psychological continuity and/or connection, leave open the 
possibility that a patient in late stage dementia is a different individual than they were 
before. Such a patient could not validly be subject to the advance directive of someone 
else. Contrary to this conclusion, McMahan argues that while it is possible that 
dementia renders someone a non-person, it does not result in a new numerical identity, 
but rather a version of their past self who fails to meet the threshold for personhood.48  
 
A minimalist account of advance directives avoids complicating the identity discussion 
further. The continuation of identity is neither necessary nor sufficient to make one 
subject to their past desires or directives. Identity need not matter in advance directives. 
All that matters is the ability of a patient to conceive of their critical interests, and be 
 
48 McMahan, Ethics of Killing. 
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affected by a state in which they are deprived of those interests; further, deprived of the 
ability to act autonomously. Even if it were the case that a dementia patient in late 
stages was no longer the same individual they were at diagnosis, the family and friends 
of the patient at onset still retain their own interests in treatment decisions. Treatment 
which fails to comport with the patient as they knew them may have deleterious effects 
on their well-being, their ability to deal with grief after the patient’s death, and the impact 
that the manner of death itself has on such close relations. The patient themselves, at 
such a point where they have lost identity, is unlikely to have distinct contemporary 
interests which could compete with such interests on behalf of friends and family. Even 
if, as some would argue, the demented patient is a different person, this does not 
preclude the family from maintaining the critical interests of the past patients, so long as 
they operate within the bounds of what we may consider a permissible outcome for the 
patient as they exist today. Answering the identity question is inconsequential, then, in 
late-stage dementia. 
 
§ 4.0 – ADVANCE EUTHANASIA DIRECTIVES & DEMENTIA PATIENTS 
To this point, I have questioned both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ accounts of the longevity of 
advance directives in the face of dementia. In §2.0, I argued that, considering their 
counterintuitive clinical results, we should consider abandoning precedent autonomy. In 
§3.0, I explored the possibility that the foundations of advance directives as previously 
conceived may be more fragile than we believed. Both strong and weak views accept 
the broad premise that the values enshrined in an advance directive has some lasting 
objective significance, even if the patient no longer conceives of it. They disagree on the 
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ease with which these directives may be overruled but agree that there is something to 
be overruled in the first place – precedent autonomy. I reject this premise, holding that 
advance directives have moral force only insofar as they enable us to avoid sentencing 
a patient to experience a state of affairs against their critical interests. Without such a 
possibility, such as in the case of late-stage dementia, there is no reason to abide by an 
advance directive for the patient’s own sake. Despite this, we may factor in the interests 
of family members and friends in protecting the patient’s past critical interests for their 
own peace of mind, when the result of such preferences could still be considered as 
being in the patient’s best experiential interests. 
 
It is not the case that people merely ‘might’ want to craft an advance euthanasia 
directive in the face of dementia: people have done so, and by all estimations will 
continue to do so until a cure for dementia is found. Those who are diagnosed with 
dementia may pursue euthanasia for a multitude of reasons. Further, they have reasons 
for seeking this procedure via an advance directive or preferring to die while they still 
understand their situation, surroundings and loved ones, in the earlier stages of their 
disease. Though there are various motivations for ending one’s life,49 or hastening 
death, in the face of a dementia diagnosis, two broad motivations emerge both in 
literature and in legal considerations.  
 
49 For the most thorough account of motivations towards suicide in the context of dementia, see Dena S 




The first is an interest in avoiding the process of losing one’s memory, one’s 
relationships with others, etc. Motivated by this concern, one may seek to commit 
suicide or seek an assisted death while one could still conceive of their critical interests 
being thwarted. This course of action is recognized in the assisted death legislation of 
both the Netherlands and Canada. But this motivation would be extremely weak in 
justifying euthanasia by advance directive, particularly because of the nature of 
dementia. The suffering of losing one’s memory, relationships, and ability to function, 
would put at risk one’s capability to comport with their critical interests. Our obligation to 
comply with an advance euthanasia directive on such grounds would be comparatively 
weak as dementia progresses. The further they progress in the stages of dementia, the 
less they are able to comport with their prior critical interests. Moreover, as they 
progress towards late stage dementia, the relationships and memories they previously 
sought to prevent will have been compromised. The situation they sought to avoid by 
euthanasia no longer being a possibility, we would have no obligation to carry it out. 
 
The second broad motivation for suicide or euthanasia in the face of dementia is an 
interest in avoiding a state at the end of dementia which the patient at onset deems 
unacceptable. This may refer to the manner of death itself, or the existence of the 
terminal dementia patient as they near death.50 This motivation falls prey to the 
progression of dementia in the same manner as the first. By the time the fears of those 
diagnosed are at the door, they will have lost the ability to conceive of their critical 
 
50 For one prominent example of such a view, see Norman L Cantor, “On Avoiding Deep Dementia,” 
Hastings Center Report 48, no. 4 (2018): 26. 
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interests, thus negating our obligation to adhere to their advance directive. Both 
motivations, on my view, provide strong reason to end one’s own life while the patient 
has a conception of critical interests to protect. But they provide weak justifications for 
advance directives, and we could not execute on them for the patient’s own sake, since 
we would not be avoiding a situation where they would experience their critical interests 
as being thwarted.  
 
Neither common motivation for suicide nor euthanasia, on my view, are sufficient to 
justify following an advance directive for the patient’s own sake. Despite this, there are 
times at which it may be permissible to execute on an advance euthanasia directive for 
other reasons. As I argued earlier, the desire to preserve a loved one’s former critical 
interests provide legitimate grounds on which family members, friends, and others with 
relationships to the patient, may seek to adhere to an advance directive in order to 
maintain their own sense of who the patient is, and how they should be treated. In what 
follows, I will outline how a minimalist account of the longevity of advance directives, 
one which disregards precedent autonomy, would handle various hypothetical cases in 
which an advance euthanasia directive exists for an incapacitated dementia patient.  
 
The first case with which we should be concerned is a case on which family desires 
conflict with an advance directive: 
Case C: C, an 83-year-old patient with late-stage Alzheimer’s Disease Dementia, 
crafted an advance euthanasia directive at the age of 76 which specified she be 
euthanized the day after her 84th birthday. Doctors expected, correctly, that by 
this point she would have global aphasia, fail to recognize her family members, 
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her own name, and her surroundings. One week before her 84th birthday, C 
meets her own directive’s stipulations for euthanasia. Despite her truncated 
abilities, C seems content with her daily life. She partakes eagerly in group 
exercise, laughs and smiles while watching birds in the courtyard. C eats 
sufficiently, has no underlying health issues, and is in no discernible pain. 
Workers in her facility describe C as their ‘happiest resident.’  
When presented with these facts, her family objects to her euthanasia. They 
enjoy visiting with C even though she fails to recognize them. It brings her family 
joy to see their mother happy at the seeming tedium of her everyday life. 
Moreover, they worry about the impact of the euthanasia procedure itself on their 
emotional wellbeing, and their memory of their mother. They accept the changes 
that dementia has wrought on their mother, and believe they could not live with 
themselves having euthanized C, even in her truncated state. 
 
On a strong view of advance directives, C’s family would be failing to respect their 
mother’s precedent autonomy in seeking the nullification of a prior advance directive. In 
Dworkin’s words, “Making someone die in a way that others approve, but he believes a 
horrifying contradiction of his life, is a devastating, odious form of tyranny.”51 But such 
an assertion misses a clearly relevant change which has occurred: namely, that C no 
longer has the capacity to think of her current state as a horrifying contradiction of her 
life. Moreover, those who would be affected by this supposed contradiction, who should, 
on Dworkin’s view, be so offended at such a change, feel no such urge. On a minimalist 
account of advance directive, this fact alone is sufficient to nullify the advance directive. 
Insofar as the family of the patient have no current interests in preserving the advance 
directive, and in fact would be negatively affected by its execution, the obligations on 
healthcare professionals to abide by the directive are nonexistent.  
 
 
51 Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, 217. 
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Since the only interests at hand in this case are the contemporary interests of the 
patient and their family, there is nothing objectionable, on my view, in the family forgoing 
C’s past wishes. Further, the alternative to this conclusion would make little sense, and 
provide little benefit to those involved. The procedure of euthanasia may be confusing 
or distressing for the patient, who is now unaware of the values which made their 
younger self seek such a death. Euthanasia may be similarly distressing for the family, 
who have accepted their mother’s current state, and see no reason for her to die 
immediately, even if they do not see her death as a prima facie harm at this stage in her 
Alzheimer’s disease.   
 
A second case presents an equally troubling occurrence, where a patient no longer 
remembers their advance directive, but other actors have strong interests in upholding 
their advance directive: 
Case D: D, an 87-year-old patient with late-stage Alzheimer’s Dementia, crafted 
an advance euthanasia directive at the age of 80, specifying that she be 
euthanized at the point at which she can no longer recognize family, read, 
interact with other clients at her care home, and has global aphasia. She is 
worried, at the time, of becoming a “vegetable” without the capacity to live as she 
once did, a state which she believes in unbearable, and intolerable. 
In her current state, D meets these qualifications. Though D is in no obvious 
pain, eats sufficiently, and displays no emotional distress, she also shows no 
signs of pleasure or contentment. She does not react to stimuli, laugh, or smile. 
She has become the “vegetable” she once feared she would.  
Her family, keen to preserve her wishes, and distressed by the state their mother 
is now in, wish to carry out the euthanasia procedure. Despite this, D lacks the 




In this case, my view conflicts with the weak view of advance directives. A weak view, 
on which a patient like D has changed sufficiently to warrant weakening or disregarding 
their advance directive, would endorse a best interests treatment standard. Such a 
standard would clearly not advocate euthanasia, since (among other reasons) there is 
no unbearable suffering which it would be in the patient’s interest to relieve. But holding 
this standard is inconsistent with how we view death for such a patient. If, tomorrow, D 
was to contract pneumonia, we could rightly think that the best course of action would 
be for D to die – that we should work to prevent suffering, and provide a comfortable 
death. Death itself is not a harm to the patient in their current state, considering their 
lack of awareness and interest not only in their current affairs but also in any sort of 
future. At this point, our courses of action include either waiting for D to die naturally, or 
euthanizing her before such an illness takes hold. The former implies a more drawn out 
process which could involve suffering both for the patient and their family, all in the 
interest of lengthening D’s life, which she has no interest in considering her state. The 
latter avoids such suffering, and does so without cost to any valuable life that D could 
have lived; it also confers a benefit of relieving (or avoiding) the suffering on behalf of 
family members. Even if we do not think that euthanasia is obligatory in this case, it is 
permissible, considering the lack of interest in continued life on behalf of D, and the 
interest in euthanasia on behalf of D’s family. 
 
We are unable to justify this latter course of action on a conventional account of 
advance directives which values precedent autonomy. But we can, and should, accept 
the administration of euthanasia in this case, as I argued above. But even if this 
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conclusion was accepted, a legal barrier remains in place which would preclude families 
from motivating for continued adherence to past critical interests. In the Netherlands, 
unbearable suffering must be confirmed before euthanasia is performed, regardless of if 
all other requirements are met at the time.52 In Canada, unbearable suffering must be 
met in order to grant a request for assisted suicide or euthanasia (it remains to be seen 
if unbearable suffering must be confirmed at the time of euthanasia). The unbearable 
suffering standard for assisted death or euthanasia is a substantial barrier to patients’ 
having their desires, and AEDs, fulfilled after they lose capacity.53 We should abandon 
the unbearable suffering standard if we are to legalize advance euthanasia directives at 
all. Since the basis for euthanasia for dementia, with such a standard, is psychological 
suffering, which would not be present in late dementia (or the suffering present would 
not be reflective of the interests on which they based their directive), upholding such a 
standard would effectively mean that all euthanasia for dementia patients would be 
outlawed. This is despite the above case, where despite a lack of unbearable suffering, 
the euthanasia of the patient is permissible.   
 
Cases C and D are important, since the strong and weak views of advance directives, 
respectively, fail to produce what I have argued are permissible outcomes. Further, 
these cases are not outlandish hypotheticals: we can each imagine ourselves in the 
position of these family members, caught between a desire to see our demented loved 
 
52 Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, “Annual Report 2017.” 
53 Marike E. de Boer et al., “Advance Directives for Euthanasia in Dementia: Do Law-Based Opportunities 




one as their past self and a drive for the humane treatment of a bewildered, suffering 
patient. Some of us may have been put in this position already, albeit without 
euthanasia as an option. That a view which rejects precedent autonomy can produce 
permissible outcomes in each case is notable, and lends credence to my earlier 
suggestion that it is precedent autonomy which confounds our thinking about advance 
directives in the face of dementia. Yet it raises the question of the precise role that 
advance directives play on this experimental view of advance directives.  
 
The explicit role of advance directives, in both of these cases, has been diminished. 
Indeed to say that advance directives, as they were articulated by the patient, have any 
guiding force in these decisions, would be incorrect. Nonetheless, they are likely to have 
some sort of implicit role in the decision-making process of the patient’s family. The 
interests of the patient’s family and friends, on a minimalist view, are what can justify the 
execution of an advance directive even after it lacks meaning for the patient 
themselves. Such interests would be informed by facts about the patient as they used to 
be: in seeking to treat their loved one as their pre-dementia self, they seek to treat them 
in a way that comports with their former values, when possible. Insofar as an advance 
directive accurately captures the past values of the patient, then, the loved ones of 
patients may rely on it to bolster their understanding of the patient’s values. Advance 
directives, then, may serve a narrative role, providing a picture of the patient as they 
once were. But, on a view which rejects precedent autonomy, they do not in themselves 
generate obligations once a patient develops late stage dementia. It is the 
contemporary wishes of the family and friends affected by the treatment of the patient, 
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in balance with the experiential interests of the patient as they exist today, which must 
be taken into consideration.   
 
§ 5.0 – CONCLUSION 
This paper largely ignores the matter of justifying assisted suicide, euthanasia, or either 
of these actions in the face of a dementia diagnosis. This is not out of ignorance for the 
very active philosophical debate on the subject. Instead, I argue that granting the 
legalization of such a practice, a revision of our common conception of advance 
directives and euthanasia is necessary. Advance directives are far weaker than the 
orthodox view argues. We are not, as Dworkin argues, obligated to follow advance 
directives out of respect for precedent autonomy. They instead gain their power from 
the obligation to avoid a future situation in which a patient experiences a life in which 
their critical interests are thwarted. We follow advance directives because they help 
patients avoid situations they would experience as intolerable. We may allow the loved 
ones of dementia patients, however, to act as though the patient still shares in their past 
critical interests. This is permissible only where the desire of these loved ones does not 
impose a substantial experiential harm on the patient.  
 
This paper does not prescribe euthanasia as the only course of action, nor does it 
prohibit the possibility that one may view dementia as not a corrupting force, but as a 
simple change. Perhaps, if such a viewpoint was embraced, patients at onset, and their 
families once the patients slip into late-stage dementia, would view the patient not as a 
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shell of their former self, but as a new version of the person they love, albeit with 
severely truncated abilities. We may view ourselves, if faced with a diagnosis of 
dementia, as someone who is soon going to experience a substantial change in 
perspective, but that this change was not necessarily harmful. Such a shift in conception 
would necessitate a change of perspective, on which this cognitive decline at the end of 
life is not met with grief, but of acceptance as a new stage of life. However unlikely I 
think this shift to be, and however difficult I find it to accept myself, such a shift in 
perspective on dementia would do nothing to complicate my view of how we should 
treat euthanasia directives if they are to be legal.  
 
Dementia poses a significant challenge to our orthodox understanding of advance 
directives. Thus far, the argument has been framed as being about the threshold of 
similarity a demented patient has to their prior, competent selves. Those who hold 
strong views set the bar high, whereas those who hold weak views set it comparatively 
low. I sought to reframe this debate, exploring an account of advance directives which 
disregarded precedent autonomy. We can, as I have argued above, make sense of 
advance directives without the concept of precedent autonomy. Moreover, abandoning 
precedent autonomy results in permissible outcomes which would otherwise be 
impossible within one cogent understanding of advance directives.  
 
The crippling blow that dementia deals to one’s autonomy and wellbeing, as well as the 
impact this disease has on families, should not be understated. But we should 
35 
 
recognize that the deprivation of autonomy by a disease cannot be remedied by 
precedent autonomy. We do not restore that which dementia has taken away by 
creating the façade that a patient still holds their past wishes. Though comforting, and at 
times permissible, the desire to treat patients as they once were cannot justify imposing 
harsh burdens on helpless patients who no longer understand the reasons behind their 
treatment. Instead, a balance must be struck between the interests of the current 
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